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TANZANIA'S CONTINUING ECONOMIC CRISIS - 1982 
By Reginald Herbold Green
Tanzania is in the midst of a severe economic crisis which became 
visible in mid-1979 and shows no signs of early abatement.
From record levels of real output per capita, purchasing power 
of exports, foreign exchange reserves and recurrent budget 
surplus in 1977-78 it experienced precipitate falls to the end of 
1979. Since then, while decline has been slowed, underlying pro­
ductive capacity and infrastructure are still deteriorating 
because of inability to finance imports and real welfare is 
still drifting downward with inflation outrunning minimum wage, 
grower crop price and - especially - salary increases.
That much is agreed by Tanzanians and outside observers. On 
causes, cures and more detailed facts tremendous differences 
arise. There is little doubt that external factors have been 
critical. Between 1972 and 1975 the changes in export and import 
prices cost Tanzania about an eighth of the purchasing power of 
its output (which is now of the order of £175 average for its 
19 million people). This was fully recovered in the 1976-77 
coffee boom, but since then a new loss of 15% has occurred - in 
1982 the average import capacity per unit of exports is about 
half what it was in 1972 or 1976/77. This has not been offset 
by rises in aid - on the contrary, real aid per capita (perhaps 
£18 per capita including technical assistance today) peaked in 
1973 or 1974, fell rapidly and has never regained its past peak. 
For Western countries there has been an upward trend since 1977 
but this has not fully affected the rundown of Chinese assistance
2Therefore, imports have had to be cut about one fifth in real 
terms since 1977/78, and the economy operates far below existing 
production capacity. As a result, personal per capita con­
sumption of manufactured goods and transport is down a third 
since 1977, and the recurrent budget is heavily in deficit because 
of shortfalls on sales tax and company tax on domestic manufac­
turing .
However, there is no doubt that four domestic causes have 
exacerbated the external factors which, beside the terms of trade, 
include military costs consequential on the Amin invasion and 
poor weather in 1979-81 following the 1976-78 run of good weather 
and record food crop years. The most critical was failure to 
give priority to increasing exports which actually declined 
about a fifth between 1970 and 1980.
The second was acceptance of the OECD view that 1976-77 repre­
sented a sustainable return to normal of the world economy/not 
a mere breathing space in a continuing crisis. As a result, 
Tanzania assumed a buoyant world economy, accepted external 
advice to liberalise imports, and adopted relatively lax budgets 
in 1976-77 and 1977-78.
Third, total failure to develop a coherent storage policy 
for food led to the loss (via spoilage or conversion into poultry 
feed and dumped exports to avoid spoilage) of up to 600,000 
tonnes of 1976-78 surpluses procured as reserves. This loss is 
comparable to 1979/80 - 1981/82 maize imports.
Fourth, until 1980 the agricultural pricing system had deteriorated 
frcm reasonable coherence in 1974/75 to anarchy, and after 1976
3so had the operations of the central grain purchasing and distri­
bution canpany. Ironically, storage policy, grower price policy 
and the creation/non dismantling of totally centralised grain 
handling were over 1975-79 areas in which Tanzania acted almost 
totally on foreign export advice - a factor in its present 
doubts about foreign analyses and prescriptions.
Tanzanian self-criticism and review leading to action has been 
penetrating and continuous at least since late 1979. It has 
sought to identify specific causes and concrete measures to 
overcome them, and to avoid dubious generalised ideological 
solutions (eg, 60% devaluations or 50% cuts of real minimum wages 
which are now about £35 a month) and confusing consequences (eg, 
the fall from 65% to 30% utilisation of industrial capacity) 
with causes (lack of the imported spares, fuel and raw materials).
Both the recurrent and capital budgets have been cut in 1979-80 
revisions, 1980-81 and 1981-82 in real per capita terms. The 
heaviest cuts have been on defence and related expenditure (down 
about 40% in constant real terms in 1981-82 from 1978-79) and new 
capital expenditure projects (down over 50% on the same basis). 
However, regaining the continous 1961-1978 record of recurrent 
surpluses (versus a 1980/81 deficit of over £100 million, or a 
sixth of recurrent spending) depends on restoring manufacturing 
output (now over a quarter below its 1978 level) and thus sales tax.
The central thrust embodied in the 1981 and 1982 National Economic 
Survival Programmes is to raise exports. In 1980 these paid for 
only 40-45% of imports. In 1981/with the new priority^the 
achieved ratio rose to about 50% while the 1982 target is 60%.
The immediate means used includes priorities in imports, (eg pesti 
ci.des, spares), transport, improved procurement for existing crops.
4The longer term measures include concentration on two key projects 
- Mufindi Pulp and Paper and Kilwa Ammonia/Urea - which could/if 
completed by 1984/provide 1990 net export earnings in excess of 
those of coffee.
Increased scrutiny of managerial efficiency - always a priority 
but one less stressed over 1977-79 - has resulted in a number of 
institutional overhauls. The problem is to bring the worst (eg, 
National Milling which lost £125 million over 1977-79 without 
anybody knowing it, so bad were its books and physical records) 
up to the standards of the best (eg, National Bank of Commerce 
and Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation whose 1980 pre-tax 
profits approximated £50 million).
This effort is greatly hampered by three factors. Import gaps 
have cut manufacturing output and raised costs, cutting a near 30% 
average return on capital employed in 1978 to the vanishing point 
by 1981.
Falls in salary purchasing power (over 50% since 1979) together 
with shortages create opportunities and incentives for corruption 
quite different from those of 1977 or even 1974-76. Morale - 
especially after overcoming the 1974-76 crisis and the 1978 Amin 
invasion - has been shaken by the apparently meagre rewards to 
major efforts and sustained austerity.
In the food and agriculture secto^the key problems do not include 
production trends which appear to be upward by 4 to 5% a year (eg, 
4.8% in coffee measured from the 1975/76 t 1980/81 peaks). They 
turn on prices, imput-transport-storage availability and availa- . 
bility of goods for peasants to buy with their earnings. 1979-82
5has seen sharp increases in average grower prices relative to 
urban goods prices (and especially to wages and salaries) reversing 
the 1975-79 decline. It has also seen a reversal of absurd 
relative prices among crops such as that which has crippled the 
cashew nut industry.
While priority attention to inputs, processing and transport is 
being given, present import capacity means they remains inadequate. 
The storage development programme has not yet been put into 
practice, and only interim grain procurement and distribution 
institutional reform steps have been taken. Until these are 
achieved, staple urban food supplies (rural food shortages are 
limited both in degree or location) will depend on imports in 
bad weather years.
Making goods available in rural shops basically requires finding 
£100 million a year of imported inputs to generate £400 million 
domestic value added in manufacturing and local inputs, £200 
million in sales tax and £900 million in retail price domestic 
manufactured goods sales. That £100 million a year is not in 
sight, and will not be for at least four to five years, unless 
interim aid increases to speed economic reconstruction can be 
mobilised.
The 1980 IMF programme proved still-born for two reasons: it 
assumed a £50 million a year World Bank structural adjustment 
programme would be concluded within months, and that the 1981 
coffee price would not fall much below 1980. Neither was correct 
so that the foreign exchange needed to meet the targets simply 
was not available.
6Prospects are-as of early 1982-poor, but not disastrous. The 
Tanzanian strategy adjustments and initiatives have halted 
chaotic decline and bought time. They have limited falls in 
minimum wage earner and peasant purchasing power and preserved 
most of the gains made in respect to basic education, health and 
water supply. The key requirement of raising export earnings is 
being pursued with some success, and the attention to removing 
and restructuring to improve average efficiency shows initial 
results.
However, if the Tanzanian restructuring and recovery is to proceed 
rapidly in terms of restored levels of purchasing power and basic 
services, then additional external financial transfers are needed. 
These are not so much for new projects - which are fairly well 
financed now - but to allow operation and maintenance of existing 
capacity, payment of commercial payments arrears (£175 million) 
and generally loosen the strangulation of production and efficiency 
by import constraints. To achieve such transfers Tanzania has 
over 1979-81 negotiated extensively with the IMF and World Bank 
while developing and acting on its National Economic Survival 
Programme. However, Tanzania has seen many of their proposals 
as inconsistent with recovery and development (including 
safeguarding peasant and worker incomes) so has to date felt 
compelled to pursue the NESP with the, admitedly inadequate, 
resources available to it from exports and existing aid flows.
